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  Love and Contracts in Don Quixote
 Martha Ertman
 
Viewing love as a contract seems, initially, like mistaking windmills for giants, or a peasant girl for a grand lady. This paper seeks, like Don Quixote, to convince you to suspend 
your practiced views of everyday relationships in order to see them in a 
new light. What seems crazy at first glance may come to look as good, 
and sometimes better, than the more conventional view. As a law pro-
fessor, I usually write about love and contracts by focusing on legal 
opinions and statutes, and recently I have added real-life stories from 
books and newspapers, as well as my friends, family, colleagues, and 
students.1 But if I am right that love and contracts often complement 
instead of oppose each other, then my argument that contracts shape 
the beginning, middle, and demise of love relationships ought to hold 
true in fiction as well, especially for the jump-off-the-page characters 
and situations in Don Quixote. Applying this analysis to Don Quixote 
invites new readings, and may even bring yet more readers to this bril-
liant text. 
 Three stories from the novel illustrate some intersections between 
love and contracts. Together, they show that while Cervantes may not 
have used the word “contract” to describe intimate, reciprocal bonds 
in romance, friendship, and marriage, he wrote each story presuming 
that readers would already see love relationships as voluntary, mutu-
al exchanges, which, when breached, give rise to damages. The three 
scenes mirror the three key stages of a contractual relationship: forma-
1  Martha M. Ertman, Love & Contracts: The HEART of the Deal (manus-
cript copy on file with the author).
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tion of the contract, its breach, and, finally, calculation of the damage 
caused by the breach. The first two passages concern formation, and 
the last addresses all three elements of formation, breach, and dam-
ages:
  
Don Quixote forms a chivalric knight/lady bond with the peasant 
girl Aldonza Lorenzo, rechristening her Dulcinea del Toboso, ap-
parently without as much as speaking with her (Cervantes 1.1.23-
24);
 After the beautiful and monied shepherdess Marcela rebuffs 
a young gentleman, Grisóstomo, and he dies of unrequited love, 
Marcela successfully defends herself against her community’s 
charge of murder by arguing that she does not have to love him 
just because he loves her (1.12.83-102); and
 In the novel-within-a-novel, The Man Who Was Recklessly 
Curious, Anselmo and Lotario, famous for their great friendship, 
agree that Lotario will court Anselmo’s wife Camila to prove her 
fidelity, which brings about a breach in both marriage and friend-
ship vows as well as fatal damages to all three of them. (1.33.272-
312) 
 
Like commercial contracts, these agreements are tailored to the desires 
of the people involved. 
 In the first passage, Don Quixote forms a love contract—governed 
by the rules of courtly love—with the newly christened Dulcinea. The 
story—and the “contract”—establish Don Quixote as a ridiculously 
idealistic protagonist, by having formed a love bond with a woman 
he seems never to have met, then adding to the lopsidedness by giving 
her a name that is the very antithesis—“lady sweetness”—of a rough, 
illiterate peasant girl. A love relationship, like a contract, requires reci-
procity, and Cervantes’s use of Don Quixote’s entirely delusional, one-
sided courtly love deal with Dulcinea as the catalyst for all of his eccen-
tric actions from then on, make humor and logical impossibility the 
very foundations of the text. The second passage, in contrast, makes a 
seemingly serious argument about marriage that likely resonated with 
readers’ experiences with changes in the contractual nature of marriage 
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in sixteenth-century Spain. Cervantes gives the rich and beautiful 
Marcela a platform to defend her right to remain single, although her 
uncle and innumerable suitors, including Grisóstomo, excoriate her as 
“cruel,” “heartless,” and even a “savage basilisk” (1.13.93; 1.14.98). She 
asserts her right to choose a mate—or no mate—declaring, “I am free 
and do not care to submit to another” (1.14.100). While the passage 
concludes with an equivocal affirmation of Marcela’s independence, 
her extended, logical monologue, paired with Don Quixote’s support 
for her position, seems to support the then-growing trend toward 
women’s ability to exercise choice in picking a mate. The third and fi-
nal passage, a novella about Anselmo’s reckless curiosity, entwines mar-
riage contracts with ancient practices of men cultivating relationships 
with one another by exchanging women. Here, Anselmo and Lotario 
agree that Lotario will court Camila to prove Camila’s fidelity. An-
selmo breaches his marriage vows to Camila by setting up the deal, and 
when Camila and Lotario become lovers, she breaches her marriage 
contract, and Lotario breaches his promise to Anselmo. The story ends 
by reciting the damages caused by these three breaches: all three die. 
A key to reading these passages, I think, is recognizing how mutual 
exchanges can shape intimate relationships. It shows that, despite our 
common view that love and contracts are opposites, readers across the 
centuries must have seen the love as at least partly contractual in order 
to laugh and learn from these stories. 
 
Contract Law 101
A contractual reading of these stories must begin by setting out two 
basic tenets about contract law. First, as my students learn on the first 
day of law school, the term “contract” is a term of art that lawyers use 
to describe the kind of agreement courts enforce (American Law Insti-
tute § 1). You “contract” to rent an apartment, which means that when 
you do not pay, the landlord can sue you. But courts will not enforce 
some agreements, like an agreement to pay your rent in sexual favors 
(American Law Institute § 178). But as any person who is not a lawyer 
knows, the law is not everything. Every day, in every country, city, and 
town, people make agreements knowing they are not legally binding, 
from making out to “compensate” your date’s paying for dinner to get-
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ting engaged.2 But these agreements, which are, like contracts, volun-
tary exchanges, still shape our lives. In my book Love & Contracts, I 
distinguish between legally binding contracts and nonbinding agree-
ments by calling the unenforceable agreements—like engagement—
“deals.” Both contracts and deals shape our love relationships. At the 
outset, people dating enter contracts with Match.com, restaurants, 
theaters, and, if it all works out, moving companies, landlords, and 
wedding planners. All these contracts help make two people an “us.” 
Deals matter too, like cooking for a date to “repay” him for taking you 
out to dinner, or, much later, agreeing that one will do the cooking and 
the other the laundry. These contracts and deals pile up, day in and day 
out, shaping our family lives. 
 Second, you need to know that there are three steps to winning a 
lawsuit for breach of contract. If, say, you do not pay your rent, your 
landlord must show a court that (1) you formed a lease contract; (2) 
you breached the contract; and (3) the breach caused the landlord 
harm (usually, lost money). If your landlord establishes all three, the 
court orders you to pay up, and if you do not, the sheriff can seize 
your couch, car, or other property to pay the landlord what he or she 
is owed. This logic holds true for deals as well as contracts, though, of 
course, the people involved resolve their dispute informally instead of 
taking it to court.
 
Love & Contracts 101
But what does all this have to do with love? Consider my research as-
sistant’s parents. They formed a deal that he mowed the lawn in ex-
change for her cleaning the house. When he developed an allergy to 
grass, she half-jokingly refused to take over the lawn unless he took on 
something she did. They agreed to what lawyers call a “modification,” 
that he would vacuum if she would start mowing the lawn. No courts 
were involved, nor ever intended. But my research assistant’s parents 
clearly formed a deal, maybe through actions as much as words, which 
he breached by stopping mowing. As in a business deal, this unexpect-
2  See Lithwick and Goldstein. 
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ed event led them to modify the deal. This kind of deal proliferates 
through all of our personal lives.
 Other deals are bigger, like the classic agreement “if we sleep to-
gether, we’ll have to get married,” which bound many in my parents’ 
generation, and still resonated strongly enough in the 1970s to make 
Meat Loaf ’s song “Paradise by the Dashboard Light” a party favorite. 
In 2008, Michelle Obama bargained with Barack Obama and his cam-
paign staff to exchange concrete promises of his continued engage-
ment in soccer games and family dinners for her support for his candi-
dacy (Case 259; Heilemann and Halperin 66-68). Like many couples, 
they had agreed to swap homemaking by one spouse for wage work 
by the other. As Obama recounts in his memoir, Michelle invoked his 
breach of this deal early in their marriage by complaining, “[Y]ou’re 
gone all the time and we’re broke? . . . How is that a good deal?” (Case 
258). Ordinary mortals strike more specific deals, like the following 
real-life examples:
 
A wife agrees to sleep with her husband after dinner in exchange 
for his doing the dishes;
A dad agrees to participate in his son’s bar mitzvah if the mom 
agrees to get a third basset hound;
A woman agrees to move to Dayton, where her boyfriend works, 
if he proposes;
One parent drops the kid off at school, and the other picks him 
up;
An elderly widower tells his daughter, “If you move home and take 
care of me, you can have the house”;
A Chinese American wife and her Jewish husband swap raising 
the kids Jewish for enrolling them in Mandarin classes;
A woman who half-knows her boyfriend is dating around ex-
changes silence for a standing Saturday night date;
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A seven-year-old swaps ten minutes of piano practice every day 
for a week for the DVD of Harry Potter and the Deadly Hollows: 
Part II.3 
 
If I am right that deals like these shape our relationships, then you 
should be thinking of deals and contracts in your own family.
 Some of these agreements used to be legally enforceable—breach 
of promise to marry cases clogged US courthouse dockets in the nine-
teenth century (Larson 383-84)—but today, they mostly play out in 
the shadow of the law. They are not negotiated by lawyers (unless the 
people themselves are lawyers, like the Obamas), and no one expects 
them to end up in court. But legal concepts of voluntary, mutual ex-
change permeate them nevertheless. Likewise, the law seems to hover 
in the background of Cervantes’s stories of love and contracts in Don 
Quixote.
 
Love and Contracts in Don Quixote
The law was in flux in early modern Spain as Cervantes wrote Don 
Quixote and the first generations of readers engaged the novel 
(González Echevarría xvi-xvii). The sixteenth and early seventeenth 
centuries ushered in an increasingly centralized and organized judi-
ciary and police presence to Spain, which increased legal enforcement 
mechanisms. Cervantes himself was imprisoned in Seville in 1597 and 
1602, a fact to which he alludes in the prologue by describing his great 
book, “the child of my understanding,” as “dry, withered, capricious, 
and filled with inconstant thoughts,” as would be expected from “a 
person begotten in a prison, where every discomfort has its place and 
every mournful sound makes its home” (I.Prologue.3). In the very first 
paragraph of the novel, Cervantes situates his book as the product of 
law, for only law could land him in jail, where he apparently gestated 
his great story. 
 The changes to the law governing marriage are particularly influ-
ential in the three passages we examine here. The Council of Trent 
(1545-63) changed marriage conventions and laws in Spain and all over 
3  Friends, family, colleagues, and a woman I met on a plane told me about 
these deals. Others are from Banks; Chua; and Szuchman and Anderson. 
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Europe by requiring for the first time that a priest officiate at a wed-
ding for it to be legitimate. Before then, two people could privately 
agree to marry, forming what were called informal or clandestine mar-
riages (Carrión xiii). In contractual terms, one could say that, prior to 
1563, mere consent was enough to form a marriage contract. After the 
Council of Trent, marriage became more of a status, created only by 
one who had priestly status to convey those rights and obligations.
 But the proportions of status and contract in marriage are extraor-
dinarily hard to measure with any precision. At the very same time that 
priestly involvement made marriage less a matter of private contract, 
marriage also became more contractual during the sixteenth century as 
people, bit by bit, attained the right to choose their own spouses. Prior 
to that, families often arranged marriages for their children, making 
the marriage contract as much a contract between families as between 
the two people getting married. However, people’s freedom to marry 
whom they chose came slowly, and was hardly self-evident during the 
sixteenth century. Even though canon law condemned coercion in se-
lecting a spouse, as late as 1812 the Constitutions of Cádiz protected 
parents’ right to arrange their children’s marriage (Carrión xiv). When 
Cervantes wrote Don Quixote, and as the first generations of readers 
engaged the book, both author and readers likely had encountered 
some of the many sermons, marriage manuals, and treatises debating 
the issue of exercise of free will in choosing one’s mate, especially when 
opposed by economic, social, and political pressures (Carrión xiv).
 The three passages explored here implicate those legal changes, es-
pecially the then-new idea that a woman could choose her mate, or 
even choose to remain single and independent. With humor and grav-
ity in turn, Cervantes contributed to the discourse of his time about 
the limits, and price, of contractual freedom in love relationships.
 
A. Don Quixote and Dulcinea Enter into a Courtly Love 
Deal
The first story introduces us to the hero Don Quixote in all his anach-
ronistic, idealistic, and delusional glory by having him enter a one-sid-
ed love relationship with a virtual stranger, elevating her from peasant 
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to lady into the bargain. His exceedingly short courtship of the woman 
he dubs Dulcinea is itself so short that we can quote it in its entirety:
 
Having cleaned his armor and made a full helmet out of a simple 
headpiece, and having given a name to his horse and decided on 
one for himself, he realized that the only thing left for him to do 
was to find a lady to love; for the knight errant without a lady-love 
was a tree without leaves or fruit, a body without a soul. He said 
to himself:
“If I, because of my evil sins, or my good fortune, meet with a giant 
somewhere, as ordinarily befalls knights errant, and I unseat him 
with a single blow, or cut his body in half, or, in short, conquer 
and defeat him, would it not be good to have someone to whom I 
could send him so that he might enter and fall to his knees before 
my sweet lady, and say in the humble voice of surrender: ‘I, lady, 
am the giant Caraculiambro, lord of the island of Malindrania, 
defeated in single combat by the never sufficiently praised knight 
Don Quixote of La Mancha, who commanded me to appear be-
fore your ladyship, so that your highness might dispose of me as 
you choose’?”
Oh, how pleased our good knight was when he had made this 
speech, and even more pleased when he discovered the one he 
could call his lady! It is believed that in a nearby village there was 
a very attractive peasant girl with whom he had once been in love, 
although she, apparently, never knew or noticed. Her name was 
Aldonza Lorenzo, and he thought it was a good idea to call her 
the lady of his thoughts, and, searching for a name that would not 
differ significantly from his and would suggest and imply that of 
a princess and great lady, he decided to call her Dulcinea of To-
boso, because she came from Toboso, a name, to his mind, that was 
musical and beautiful and filled with significance, as were all the 
others he had given to himself and everything pertaining to him. 
(1.1.23-24)
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While they don’t marry—they may never have met—Don Quixote 
does give Aldonza Lorenzo a name that he has devised. The joke ro-
mance is conveyed in part through the double meaning of the name 
that Don Quixote assigns Aldonza. Her name is his because he makes 
it up for her, and also because her new name, like his, is made up of a 
new name and a place of origin, a template that would not differ sig-
nificantly from his. 
 The passage is only funny—and ridiculously delusional—if we 
expect relationships between lovers to be reciprocal. Contracts, by 
definition, are voluntary, reciprocal agreements. They require that one 
person offer something and the other accept it, for example, when I 
offer to sell you my bike for $500 and you agree to buy it. But Don 
Quixote never makes an offer of love to Aldonza Lorenzo. Even if he 
had, there is good reason to expect that this “very attractive” peasant, 
young enough to be called a “girl,” might well spurn the advances of a 
delusional 50-year-old man with a weathered complexion, and flesh 
both scrawny and gaunt. He does not even have wealth to offer her 
(1.1.19).4 Having never received an offer, of course she does not accept, 
so there is no agreement. But Don Quixote single-handedly trans-
forms the usual two-way relationship into a one-sided monologue. 
Rather than falling in love with a person, as would happen in real life, 
Don Quixote falls for a virtual stranger, and then amplifies the fiction 
by giving her a name that describes her very opposite. He is in love 
with a woman he does not know, who does not know of this love, and 
does not even know her new name. Thus we come to know and like 
Don Quixote in all his wackiness. 
 This one-way pseudo love agreement conveys a message we get 
elsewhere in the novel: that the life of the imagination may be more 
real than we think, and better than mundane reality. Dulcinea’s utter 
ignorance of Don Quixote’s service does not keep him from invoking 
her protection in his battle with the muledriver, in which he prevails 
(1.3.32). Unfortunately for Don Quixote, however, the mere thought 
of her is not enough for him to vanquish the windmills (1.8.59). Like 
4  According to Edith Grossman, Don Quixote’s clothing and dining habits peg 
him as rural gentry in reduced circumstances (19n1). However, González Echevarría 
suggests that Aldonza’s parents would have thought Don Quixote a catch (41-42).
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Don Quixote coaxing a woman he has never met to accompany him 
on the ups and downs of his imaginary journey, Cervantes invites 
us into a one-way relationship between author and reader in which 
he shares the depths of his brilliance, idealism, humor, and wisdom. 
Granted, we do buy the book and benefit the memory of Cervantes 
in collections like this one. Moreover, unlike Dulcinea, who has no 
choice in the matter, we choose to pick up and hold the big book, ac-
cepting Cervantes’s offer to follow Don Quixote in his adventures. 
Like Sancho Panza, we get the pleasure of suspending our disbelief for 
a short while, imagining a world like the one Cervantes paints, where 
fact and fiction continually blur, as when Sancho finally gets to govern 
the island Don Quixote promised him as payment for his squirely ser-
vices. Moreover Sancho, like the duke, duchess, Knight of the White 
Moon, other characters, and the reader, comes to believe, along with 
Don Quixote—and Cervantes—that imagination may play a bigger, 
and better, role in our real lives than we realize.
 Those insights hold true to this day. Don Quixote continues to of-
fer belly laughs and insights fully four hundred years after Cervantes 
penned these words because he managed to capture some of the ri-
diculousness and seriousness of love and life everywhere, for everyone. 
Three hundred years after Cervantes published Don Quixote, Virginia 
Woolf spoke to the continued pattern of women serving as mirrors for 
men to gaze on enlarged versions of themselves: “Women have served 
all these centuries as looking-glasses possessing the magic and delicious 
power of reflecting the figure of man at twice its natural size” (38). Ro-
berto González Echevarría echoes this view by describing Dulcinea as 
“a projection of Don Quixote’s own quest for self, an image of his own 
buried longings” (47). As a character, she exists only to reflect Don 
Quixote’s delusion, at twice its natural size, by magnifying his lunacy 
through their unilateral love pact.
 Great literature, of course, delivers more than one message. The 
second passage, about the nonformation of another love contract, 
builds on the funny story of Don Quixote and Dulcinea’s noncon-
sensual relationship by exploring the much more serious question of 
whether Dulcinea would have had the power to refuse Don Quixote’s 
offer of love, had he made it to her.
 Warshawsky / Parr 261
B. Marcela Successfully Refutes Claim that She Should 
Have Accepted Gristóstomo’s Offer of Love
Sixty pages after the story of Don Quixote selecting and naming Dul-
cinea, Cervantes revisits the question of one-sided love affairs. Here, 
even more than in the pseudo deal between Don Quixote and Dul-
cinea, law structures the narrative. Don Quixote first hears about the 
alluring Marcela from Pedro, a young man who tells him:
  
This morning the famous student shepherd named Gristóstomo 
died, and they say he died of love for that accursed girl Marcela, 
the daughter of Guillermo, the rich man, the same girl who dresses 
up like a shepherdess and wanders around the wild, empty places. 
(1.12.81)
 
We learn that both Marcela and Gristóstomo were just playing at be-
ing shepherds, since he was a student from Salamanca, “very learned 
and well-read,” while she, “a very rich girl,” had inherited her parents’ 
money and been raised by her uncle (1.12.82-83). By the time she was 
a teenager, “no man could look at her and not bless God for making 
her so beautiful, and most fell madly in love with her” (1.12.83-84). 
Marcela’s uncle let her choose among her many suitors, Pedro reports 
approvingly, because he believed, rightly, that “parents shouldn’t force 
their children into marriage against their will” (1.12.84). But Marcela 
refused them all, opting instead to don shepherdess’s garb and “go out 
to the countryside with the other shepherdesses and to watch over her 
own flock” (1.12.84). Her beauty so entranced the local men that “rich 
young men, nobleman and farmers, began to dress up like Gristósto-
mo and to court her in these fields” (1.12.84). She refused all of them, 
apparently leading Gristóstomo to kill himself.
 The locals blame Marcela for Gristóstomo’s death, deriding her 
as “cruel and ungrateful,” and stand watch to see which of the men 
will finally triumph over the “beautiful Marcela, free and self-assured” 
(1.12.85). As they further discuss the case, the accusations turn much 
more serious, denouncing Marcela as “the murderous shepherdess” 
(1.13.87). When Marcela shows up at Gristóstomo’s funeral, one of the 
men accuses her directly, asking, “Do you come, O savage basilisk of 
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these mountains, to see if with your presence blood spurts from the 
wounds of this wretched man whose life was taken by your cruelty?” 
(1.14.98), referring to the medieval legend that a victim’s wounds re-
opened in the killer’s presence (Grossman 98n1).
 By charging Marcela with murder, the men invoke the law’s power 
to punish her. “Murder,” like “contract,” is a legal term of art. Just as only 
agreements that meet the definition of “contract” are legally binding, 
the law punishes only those killings that fit the definition of murder 
(or a lesser crime, like manslaughter). While the definition of murder 
changes from place to place and over time, one traditional definition 
of murder is unlawful killing with malice aforethought (Garner 1114). 
Marcela delivers a lawyerly two-and-a-half page defense, effectively ar-
guing that she is not liable for murder because she had no malice for 
Gristóstomo or any of the other suitors. Her central claim is that she 
had no obligation to accept Gristóstomo’s offer of love. Like a lawyer 
arguing to a jury, she begins by presenting an overview of her defense:
 
I return here on my own behalf to explain how unreasonable are 
those who in their grief blame me for the death of Gristóstomo, 
and so I beg all those present to hear me, for there will be no need 
to spend much time or waste many words to persuade discerning 
men of truth. Heaven made me, as all of you say, so beautiful that 
you cannot resist my beauty and are compelled to love me, and be-
cause of the love you show me, you claim that I am obliged to love 
you in return. . . . I cannot grasp why, simply because it is loved, 
the thing loved for its beauty is obliged to love the one who loves 
it. (1.14.98-99)
 
She then adeptly switches from her focus on a “thing” that is loved, 
to a person, herself, first asserting an autonomy that must have been 
startling to early seventeenth-century readers, and then cleverly turn-
ing the tables on her accusers by asking if she has the right to demand 
love from everyone:
 
true love is not divided and must be voluntary, not forced. If this is 
true, as I believe it is, why do you want to force me to surrender my 
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will, obliged to do so simply because you say you love me? But if 
this is not true, then tell me: if the heaven that made me beautiful 
had made me ugly instead, would it be fair for me to complain that 
none of you loved me? (1.14.99)
 
Next, Marcela directly refutes the murder charge by claiming that na-
ture, or Gristóstomo himself, caused his death. As lawyers often do, 
she presents alternative arguments from which her listeners (and read-
ers) can choose, including an analogy that puts the blame on nature, 
and another that puts it on Gristóstomo’s “impatience and rash desire” 
(1.14.100):
  
you must consider that I did not choose the beauty I have, and, 
such as it is, heaven gave it to me freely, without my requesting or 
choosing it. And just as the viper does not deserve to be blamed 
for its venom, although it kills, since it was given the venom by na-
ture, I do not deserve to be reproved for being beautiful, for beauty 
in the chaste woman is like a distant fire or sharp-edged sword: 
they do not burn or cut the person who does not approach them. 
. . . Why should a woman, loved for being beautiful, lose that vir-
tue in order to satisfy the desire of a man who, for the sake of his 
pleasure, attempts with all of his might and main to have her lose 
it? (1.14.99)
  
Marcela continues her defense by reminding her accusers that they 
bear the burden of proof, and must produce evidence of some wrong-
doing by her, like breaching a promise to Gristóstomo, before the law 
can punish her:
 
Let the one I deceived complain, let the man despair to whom I 
did not grant a hope I had promised, or speak if I called to him, 
or boast if I accepted him; but no man can call me cruel or a mur-
derer if I do not promise, deceive, call to, or accept him. (1.14.100)
 
In the same vein, she contends that the suitors could have avoided 
their losses by simply avoiding her:
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Let him who calls me savage basilisk avoid me as he would some-
thing harmful and evil; let him who calls me ungrateful, not serve 
me, unapproachable, not approach me, cruel, not follow me; let 
him not seek me out, serve, approach or follow in any way this 
savage, ungrateful, cruel, unapproachable basilisk. For if his impa-
tience and rash desire killed Gristóstomo, why should my virtuous 
behavior and reserve be blamed? (1.14.100)
 
Finally, Marcela rests her case by returning to her initial claim of per-
sonal autonomy, giving voice to an argument that prefigures Virginia 
Woolf ’s early twentieth-century assertion that a woman needs money 
of her own and “a room with a lock on the door” (115): “As you know, 
I have wealth of my own and do not desire anyone else’s; I am free and 
do not care to submit to another” (1.14.100).
 Rather than waiting to hear the men’s response to her speech, 
Marcela underlines its substance with her actions by turning on her 
heel and leaving. Cervantes describes the men as impressed, if not con-
vinced, by her argument. But some, “pierced by the powerful arrow of 
the light in her beautiful eyes,” so missed her point that they wanted 
to follow her into the woods (1.14.101). But Don Quixote did not. He 
dissuaded them, declaring:
 
Let no person, whatever his circumstance or condition, dare to 
follow the beautiful Marcela lest he fall victim to my fury and out-
rage. She has shown with clear and sufficient reasons that she bears 
little or no blame for the death of Gristóstomo, and she has also 
shown how far she is from acquiescing to the desires of any who 
love her, and therefore it is just that rather than being followed and 
persecuted, she should be honored and esteemed by all good peo-
ple in the world, for she has shown herself to be the only woman 
in it who lives with so virtuous a desire. (1.14.101)
  
In the dialogue between Marcela, her accusers, and Don Quixote, it 
is difficult to determine which position Cervantes adopts. But Mar-
cela’s long, eloquent, and logical speech, coupled with Don Quixote’s 
siding with her, suggests that Cervantes’s formidable imagination may 
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have extended centuries into the future, foretelling seismic changes in 
gender politics. However, the text can also be read to condemn Mar-
cela. Cervantes gives the last word to the accusers, via Gristóstomo’s 
epitaph:
 
 Here lies the sad cold
 body of a lover,
 a shepherd destroyed
 by an icy heart.
 The pitiless hand killed him,
 extending the power
 of love’s tyranny. (1.14.101)
 
Ultimately, the text leaves open the possibility of female autonomy. 
The artist Santi Moix, whose drawings from Don Quixote have recently 
brought Cervantes’s genius to new audiences, reminds us that great art 
is “ever-young and never docile” (“Paul Kasmin Gallery”), which both 
allows us to entertain the possibility that Cervantes prefigured centu-
ries of social and political thought and prevents us from holding him 
firmly to any political position. All we know for sure is that Marcela 
gets the stage for several pages to argue that women are people whose 
consent is necessary to finalize a love deal, not things to be bought off 
a shelf, and that Cervantes has not presented her position as comedic 
or insane. The third and final contract-related passage becomes more 
serious yet in revisiting this issue of whether men may treat women as 
objects of exchange.
 
C. Anselmo, Lotario, and Camila Create and Breach 
Friendship and Marriage Deals
Cervantes’s novel within a novel tells the story of a marriage contract 
within a friendship contract. In The Man Who Was Recklessly Curi-
ous, the primary relationship is the friendship between Anselmo and 
Lotario, who are widely known as “the two friends” (1.33.272). When 
Anselmo marries Camila, seemingly to maintain the intimacy of that 
friendship as well as prove Camila’s virtue, Anselmo gets Lotario to 
promise to court her. Lotario’s courtship is so smooth—making his 
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moniker shorthand for seduction itself to this day—that Camila suc-
cumbs and they become lovers. That breach of both marriage and 
friendship deals results in the ultimate damage, for all three lie dead 
by the end of the tale. 
 According to anthropologists like Claude Lévi-Strauss and Gail 
Rubin, kinship has long been structured around exchanges between 
men, especially the exchange of women (Lévi-Strauss; Rubin). That 
pattern survives to this day, despite modern laws and customs that 
have elevated women from things to human beings. At marriage, most 
American women still give up their “maiden name,” generally their 
father’s, to take their husband’s name. A good number of weddings 
similarly feature a reenactment of the exchange of a woman between 
father and husband when fathers walk their daughters down the aisle 
to give them away, as it is put, at the altar. These ancient patterns were 
just beginning to change in early modern Spain, a process that took 
centuries and may not yet be complete.
 Cervantes’s story The Man Who Was Recklessly Curious may well 
have played a role in that gradual progression away from marriage as 
exchange between men and toward marriage as consensual contract 
between men and women. While all three characters pay with their 
lives for the breach of both friendship and marriage deals, the narrative 
suggests Anselmo may be most at fault by starting it all with his treat-
ment of Camila as an object of exchange.
 The story adopts the framework of a deal from the outset, describ-
ing Anselmo and Lotario’s relationship as “a mutual, reciprocal friend-
ship” in which the friends took turns doing each one’s favorite pas-
times, which worked as smoothly as a well-adjusted clock (1.33.272). 
Their friendship took such precedence that Anselmo needed Lotario’s 
assent, and skills as an intermediary, in order to marry the “distin-
guished and beautiful” Camila (1.33.272-73). Anselmo acts as if his 
friend is a person, and his wife is a thing. When he marries Camila, he 
finds himself “in possession of what he desired,” and he tells Lotario 
that Camila had “no wish or desire other than what he wanted her to 
have” (1.33.272-73). But Lotario treats the marriage as a relationship 
rather than a property acquisition, and keeps his distance from An-
selmo and Camilla’s household since, he reasons, “one should not visit 
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or linger at the houses of married friends as if both were still single” 
(1.33.273). 
 Anselmo wants to have deals, marriage, and the old intimate 
friendship. The two friends argue back and forth, Anselmo entreat-
ing Lotario to resume their old intimacy, and Lotario resisting. Finally, 
Anselmo succeeds in reeling Lotario back in through an agreement by 
which Lotario will court Camila to prove her virtue to Anselmo’s satis-
faction. Like any contract, it starts with an offer. Anselmo tells Lotario 
that he is miserable because Camila may not be “as good and perfect” 
as he thinks, since her virtue has never been tempted:
 
my desire is for Camila, my wife, to pass through these difficul-
ties, and be refined and prove her value in the fire of being wooed 
and courted by one worthy of desiring her; and if she emerges, as I 
believe she will, triumphant from this battle, I shall deem my good 
fortune unparalleled. (1.33.275)
 
Lotario refuses, and the two again go back and forth, comparing Ca-
mila to valuable and luxurious objects of trade like diamonds, ermine, 
and mirrors (1.33.279-80). Lotario tries, unsuccessfully, to argue An-
selmo out of the deal, first in religious terms, reminding him that mar-
riage is a sacrament, then in economic language, contending that the 
costs of the deal would greatly outweigh any benefit (1.33.282). Finally, 
they agree that Lotario will woo Camila “indifferently and falsely,” and 
that Anselmo will be content with that modest beginning (1.33.283). 
 But lukewarm courting does not satisfy Anselmo’s curiousity. 
Anselmo insists that Lotario court Camila aggressively, and Lotario 
obliges and falls in love with Camila as he spends so much time with 
her and appreciates her dogged resistance to his advances. Anselmo 
even puts Camila in a catch-22 situation when she tries to get away 
from Lotario, ordering her to remain, so that she cannot safeguard 
her virtue without disobeying her husband. When Camila finally suc-
cumbs to Lotario’s advances, Lotario lies to him that Camila passed 
the test, and tries to call off the deal. But Anselmo persists in treating 
Camila as an object of exchange between the two friends, importun-
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ing his friend to continue what Anselmo thought was a charade, “if 
only for the sake of curiosity and amusement” (1.34.291).
 Predictably, the three are destroyed by the twin breaches of friend-
ship and marriage promises. After Camila and Lotario run away, An-
selmo dies of grief. Lotario dies in battle, and Camila’s life “ended in 
the pitiless embrace of sorrow and melancholy” (1.36.312).
 Cervantes adds little commentary to the tale, other than to have 
the priest who reads it opine that it was unlikely to actually happen 
between husband and wife, though lovers might create such a mess. 
However, Cervantes himself was embroiled in an affair with a mar-
ried woman, which produced a child (Echevarría xix.). Rather than 
view the Reckless Curiosity as a simple morality tale, we can read it as 
one of several meditations on the mix of love and contracts. The con-
tractual nature of marriage—including the contractual exchanges be-
tween men that traditionally structured marriage—was under recon-
struction when Cervantes wrote, and his stories seem to engage the 
pros and cons of that transition. While he does not clearly argue for 
contractual freedom—Marcela’s defense against murder charges ends 
ambiguously and Anselmo, Lotario, and Camila all die—he does seem 
to invite us to imagine what life might look like if women had more 
contractual freedom in marriage.
 Today in the United States, couples enjoy more contractual free-
dom than even Cervantes could have imagined. Courts enforce agree-
ments that cohabitants make to share property (palimony), while gay 
couples can “contract” into marriage or a mini marriage called domes-
tic partnership or civil union in nearly half the states. Genetic fathers 
“contract” out of legal fatherhood through reproductive technologies 
like alternative insemination, and social parents contract into legal par-
enthood in these transactions. Jews not only can live freely and openly, 
but even marry whom they choose, and courts often enforce Jewish 
marriage contracts known as ketubot.5 These relatively new rules be-
came legal doctrine only when imaginative lawyers and parties—and 
5  See Avitzur v. Avitzur; Goodridge v. Dept. of Pub. Health; Marvin v. 
Marvin; and National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.
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the occasional novelist—pushed for us to recognize the consensual, 
reciprocal exchanges that shape marriage and other love relationships.
  
Conclusion
By depicting voluntary, mutual exchanges as central to relationships, 
Cervantes shows the web of contracts and deals that thread through 
relationships in fiction and real life, hidden in plain sight. They shape 
every stage of ordinary dating, engagement, marriage, and day-to-day 
family life, as well as divorce. The recognition of these exchanges, and 
what happens when they are formed improperly or breached, is part of 
what makes Don Quixote so unexpectedly contemporary. Cervantes’s 
imaginative genius may even have extended so far as to imagine a world 
in which women might be free and independent in marriage, instead 
of objects to be acquired and controlled. More poetically, Cervantes’s 
conceptual space, located between the literal truth that a peasant girl 
is not an aristocratic lady, and the emotional truth that devotion can 
reveal the lady in the peasant girl as surely as mistrust can demote a 
lady to an adulterer, sets the stage for what I take to be Don Quixote’s 
major point: defending the life of the imagination as equally good, if 
not superior, to a life lived with both feet firmly on the ground. If link-
ing love and contracts is insane, it is an insanity that Cervantes may 
well have embraced. 
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